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INTRODUCTION
Forty years after the Supreme Court held in Brady v. Maryland that the
Constitution requires the government to disclose favorable evidence to criminal
defendants,' prosecutors still frequently fail to perform this duty.2 Such failures
violate defendants' rights to due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments and thwart the various protections that together constitute the
fundamental right to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment. By directly
handicapping the defense, Brady violations also diminish the ability of the
criminal justice system to distinguish accurately between the guilty and the
innocent.
Nevertheless, most Brady violations pass undiscovered or without remedy.
When favorable evidence remains buried, defendants do not know that their
rights were violated. And even when suppressed evidence does come to light,
reviewing courts usually deem suppressions "harmless" and uphold the
convictions.3 Thus, not only are defendants' rights rarely vindicated, but also
the government rarely suffers a serious penalty for its misconduct.
Because Brady and its progeny accord prosecutors nearly unchecked
discretion, reducing the number of violations requires changing the way
individual prosecutors approach their Brady duties: the rigor with which they
look for Brady evidence in the government's possession, the amount of time
they spend imagining how a piece of evidence might be favorable to the
defense, and the consideration they give to the consequences of disclosing too
little. A remedy that vindicates the rights of defendants and also entails
immediate consequences for prosecutors - a remedy at trial - might accomplish
this fundamental change.
This Note proposes such a remedy: When the defendant learns during or
shortly before trial that the government failed to disclose significant favorable
evidence, the court should consider instructing the jury on Brady law and
granting the defendant permission to argue that the failure raises a reasonable
doubt about the defendant's guilt. Part I briefly describes the status quo. Part II
proposes the fair trial remedy. Part III suggests how the remedy might come
into use.
1. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2. See infra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
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I. THE DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM
In 1963, the Supreme Court ruled in Brady that "the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. "4 Brady's
significance lies in the phrase "irrespective of the good faith or bad faith": the
Court had earlier ruled that a person's due process rights are violated when the
government deliberately suppresses favorable evidence.'
The Court has since ruled that the Constitution requires disclosure of
impeachment evidence,6 evidence possessed by the government even if not by
the prosecutor,7 and evidence not specifically requested by the defense.8 The
standard by which today's courts of appeal judge Brady claims was first
enunciated in United States v. Bagley in 1985: A conviction must be overturned
"if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable
probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome."9
The range and frequency of prosecutors' failures to disclose Brady evidence
have been widely lamented.° A treatise on prosecutorial misconduct states that
4. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
S. See Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942) (holding that a person's due process rights are
violated when "imprisonment resulted from perjured testimony, knowingly used by the
State authorities . . . and from the deliberate suppression by those same authorities of
evidence favorable to him"); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (holding that it
violates due process "if a State has contrived a conviction through ... a deliberate deception
of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured").
6. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
7. See Kyles v. Whidey, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995).
s. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976).
9. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
1o. See, e.g., BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIvE DAYS TO EXECUTION, AND OTHER
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 246 (2000) (finding prosecutorial misconduct
a cause of wrongful conviction in forty-two percent of sixty-two cases examined); Hugo
Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40
STAN. L. REV. 21, 56-60 (1987) (finding and discussing prosecutorial suppression of
exculpatory evidence in 35 out of 350 cases of wrongful conviction); Richard A. Rosen,
Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REv.
693, 697-703, 731-33 (1987) (noting the "disturbingly large number of published opinions"
involving "deliberately suppressed unquestionably exculpatory evidence" that nevertheless
did not result in disciplinary action against prosecutors, classifying typical Brady violations,
and arguing that further deterrents are necessary); Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a
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"[a] prosecutor's violation of the obligation to disclose favorable evidence
accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other type of malpractice,
but is rarely sanctioned by courts, and almost never by disciplinary bodies.""
The very nature of Brady violations - that evidence was suppressed - means
that defendants learn of violations in their cases only fortuitously, when the
evidence surfaces through an alternate channel. Nevertheless, a recent
empirical study of all 5760 capital convictions in the United States from 1973 to
1995 found that prosecutorial suppressions of evidence accounted for sixteen
percent of reversals at the state postconviction stage.'2 And a study of 1,ooo
cases involving prosecutorial misconduct in the years since the Brady decision
identified 381 homicide convictions that were vacated "because prosecutors hid
evidence or allowed witnesses to lie." 3 That study's authors note, however,
that their findings represent "only a fraction" of the amount of serious
misconduct, because so much misconduct is undetected.' 4
Commentators have variously attributed these violations to excessive
caseloads and inexperience;"5 the desire to win for professional or political
gain; 6 aspirations to "do the higher justice" by ensuring the conviction of the
guilty even at the cost of suppressing evidence; 17 and the inherent conflict
between prosecutors' habitual role as "zealous advocates" and the task of
Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors To Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833, 836, 844-48, 869-71, 933-34 (1997) (arguing that the current
Brady doctrine results in "the almost routine violation of the fundamental guarantee of a fair
trial"); Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. lo, 1999,
at Al (summarizing the results of the reporters' nationwide study of prosecutorial
misconduct in homicide cases).
11. BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT ix (2d ed. 2005).
12. James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEX. L.
REv. 1839, 1846, 185 (2000).
13. Armstrong & Possley, supra note lo.
14. Id.
15. Alexandra White Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-Benefit Calculus of the Misbehaving Prosecutor:
Deterrence Economics and Transitory Prosecutors, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 45, 62-63
(2005); Armstrong & Possley, supra note io (noting comments of the New Orleans District
Attorney that: "Turnover is rampant. He has 8o prosecutors, and this year, 30 are new. Next
year, 30 more will be new. His prosecutors average 30 jury trials year-a daunting
caseload -and they can find it difficult to keep track of what evidence has been disclosed in
every case they handle .... ).
16. Dunahoe, supra note 15, at 59-6o; Rosen, supra note io, at 732.
17. Weeks, supra note lo, at 834-35; see also Rosen, supra note io, at 732 ("It is also likely that in
most cases the prosecutor believes the defendant is guilty, and therefore might be motivated
by the concern that, in one sense, justice will not be served by revealing evidence which will
increase the probability that the defendant will go free.").
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searching for evidence that might jeopardize their own cases." Even cognitive
psychology has been brought to bear, with one scholar hypothesizing that
prosecutors' belief in the guilt of those they prosecute may pose a fundamental
psychological obstacle to their grasping the exculpatory value of evidence.19
When a prosecutor is inclined against disclosing a piece of arguably
favorable evidence, few considerations weigh in favor of disclosure. Trial courts
are reticent to grant motions to compel disclosure of alleged Brady evidence,20
examine government files,2" or hold prosecutors in contempt." Defendants
only rarely unearth suppressions. 3 And, even when they do, their convictions
are rarely overturned because they face a tremendous burden on appeal 4:
showing that the suppression raises a "reasonable probability that, had the
ig. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 696-97 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Scott
E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33
McGEORGE L. REv. 643, 650-55 (2002); Weeks, supra note 1o, at 843-44.
19. Sundby, supra note 18, at 655 ("[R]esearch on 'cognitive conservatism' ... consistently
shows that individuals are resistant to changing an existing view of facts and, consequently,
try to incorporate new information in a way that confirms the pre-existing view.").
20. See, e.g., United States v. Blackley, 986 F. Supp. 6oo (D.D.C. 1997) (refusing to grant a
motion to compel), affd on other grounds, 167 F.3d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also id. at 607
("This court simply responds to defendant's claim of under inclusiveness by noting that if
the sword of Damocles is hanging over the head of one of the two parties, it is hanging over
the head of [the government]. Brady is first and foremost a post-trial remedy, and the
penalty for failing to disclose material exculpatory evidence relevant to a finding of guilt or
punishment is the setting aside of a conviction on appeal.").
21. Trial courts have a host of reasons for opposing review in camera. See 5 WAYNE R. LAFAvE
ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.3(b), at 488-89 (2d ed. 1999). Nevertheless, at least one
commentator has proposed that courts take on the burden in order to improve defendants'
access to favorable evidence. Daniel J. Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the
Agurs Problems of Prosecutorial Discretion and Retrospective Review, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 391
(1984).
22. See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and
Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 893-97 (1995).
23. See Weeks, supra note lo, at 869 ("For every one of these cases, we have every reason to
suspect that there are many more in which the prosecutor's refusal to disclose the
exculpatory evidence was never discovered by the defendant or his attorney.").
24. The obstacle to Brady enforcement posed by the Bagley standard has been widely discussed.
See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PrTT. L. REV. 393, 438 (1992)
(concluding that when a prosecutor has sufficient evidence to convict, "under the Supreme
Court's current disclosure rules, the prosecutor's decision to suppress favorable evidence
would be a perfectly rational, albeit unethical, act"); Meares, supra note 22, at 91o; Rosen,
supra note ao, at 705-o8 (noting that the Bagley standard applies "no matter how flagrant or
intentional the prosecutor's misconduct"); Sundby, supra note 18, at 645-58; Weeks, supra
note lo, at 902 (citing the immunity of prosecutors to civil suits along with the materiality
standard as the "primary obstacles" to reducing prosecutors' Brady violations).
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evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. '2 Finally, lawyers' professional associations do not frequently
discipline prosecutors for even the most egregious Brady violations.26
Accordingly, it is not surprising that one commentator has gone so far as to call
the Brady right "a right that almost begs to be violated," arguing that "as a
practical matter, there is almost nothing that presently prevents the prosecutor
disposed to do so from routinely withholding exculpatory evidence. 
27
Brady v. Maryland declares that the principle behind overturning
convictions for the suppression of favorable evidence is "not punishment of
society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the
accused. Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal
trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any
accused is treated unfairly. '' 28 Rather than only being remedied in rare cases by
a new trial, Brady violations should be prevented in the first place, so that all
defendants enjoy their rights to a fair trial under the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. In the next two Parts, this Note will offer one way
this might be accomplished.
II. A FAIR TRIAL REMEDY
I propose that when suppressed favorable evidence comes to light during or
shortly before a trial, the trial court should consider instructing the jury on
Brady law and allowing the defendant to argue that the government's failure to
disclose the evidence raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt. I
call this a "fair trial remedy," because instead of curing the Brady violation
25. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
26. A comprehensive search in 1987 revealed only nine cases in which any state bar disciplinary
committee even considered disciplining a prosecutor for Brady-related misconduct. Rosen,
supra note lo, at 720. The Chicago Tribune's study found that none of the prosecutors
involved in the 381 vacated homicide convictions was disbarred or given "any kind of public
sanction from a state lawyer disciplinary agency." Only one prosecutor was fired, "but
appealed and was reinstated with back pay," and only one prosecutor's law license was
suspended-due to other misconduct. The reporters concluded: "It is impossible to say
whether any of the prosecutors received any professional discipline at all, because most
states allow agencies to discipline lawyers privately if the punishment is a low-grade
sanction like an admonition or reprimand." Armstrong & Possley, supra note lO.
27. Weeks, supra note lo, at 836, 835.
28. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
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through reversal on appeal, the remedy corrects the trial itself.29 In
contributing to a jury's decision to acquit, the remedy would provide more
immediate relief than a postconviction reversal. Yet, because the remedy would
not free or even grant a new trial to defendants of whose guilt the government
has sufficient evidence, the remedy would not run afoul of those who decry the
social costs of other "punishments" for prosecutors, such as overturning
convictions or dismissing charges.3"
A. The Remedy in Practice
The remedy would be structurally similar to the "missing evidence" and
"missing witness" doctrines. Each side in a criminal case has long been allowed
to argue that the failure of a party to produce a witness or evidence when that
party might be naturally expected to do so creates an inference that the missing
testimony or evidence would have been unfavorable to that party.3 This
adverse inference may then, with the court's permission, be argued in closing
and addressed by a jury instruction. The prerequisites are a showing that the
testimony would have "elucidated the transaction" - i.e., that it would not
simply have been cumulative-and that the evidence or witness was
"peculiarly" available to the nonproducing party.32
The corresponding Brady remedy would require defendants to establish
that favorable evidence in the government's possession had been suppressed,
and that the suppression had significantly hampered the defense's
investigation and preparation for trial. The defense would also have to show
29. The idea of a "fair trial remedy," of trying to fix a pretrial constitutional error at trial, was
first suggested to me by its mention in the speedy trial context in AKHIL REED AMAR, THE
CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 101 (1997).
30. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH. U.
L.Q713 (1999). Henning seems to cry out for a fair trial remedy:
[P]unishing a prosecutor by granting the defendant relief, such as excluding
evidence or dismissing charges, does not necessarily vindicate the interests of the
community. Instead, it may produce a windfall for the defendant. A remedy
granted solely to deter future prosecutorial misconduct can lead to incongruous
results, such as the dismissal of charges when it is likely that the defendant is
guilty of the crime, or reversal of a conviction when the proceeding was otherwise
fair. Nevertheless, finding improper intent without meting out punishment gives
the impression that the courts are powerless in the face of prosecutorial misuse of
authority.
Id. at 717 (footnote omitted).
31. See 29 AM. JUR. 2DEvidence 5 247, at 259-61 (2005).
32. Graves v. United States, 15o U.S. ni8, 121 (1893).
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that the suppressed evidence was not merely cumulative of other favorable
evidence in the defense's possession, and the defense did not have access to the
suppressed evidence and could not reasonably have been expected to find the
evidence through other channels.
The remedy would exist primarily for the benefit of defendants when the
government's tardiness3 or failure to disclose favorable evidence permanently
prejudiced the defense. Permanent prejudice might consist of the
disintegration of tangible evidence or the death or disappearance of a witness
or alternative suspect. In such cases, neither granting a continuance for further
investigation nor the fact that the defendant may be able to make some use of
the belatedly disclosed evidence is a sufficient remedy.34
Because Brady holds prosecutors responsible for disclosing not only the
favorable evidence in the prosecutor's files, but also favorable evidence
possessed by other government agencies,3" this remedy would be available no
matter where within the government the undisclosed evidence had lain. As
Justice Souter wrote in Kyles v. Whitley,
procedures and regulations can be established to carry [the
prosecutor's] burden and to insure communication of all relevant
information on each case to every lawyer who deals with it. Since, then,
the prosecutor has the means to discharge the government's Brady
33. Most jurisdictions have the vague requirement that prosecutors carry out Brady disclosures
in a sufficiently timely fashion to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively
in the presentation of its case. See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 1198 (ioth ed. 2002). Most courts have held that
disclosure at any time prior to or during trial is timely unless the defendant can prove
prejudice from the delayed disclosure. See, e.g., Ebron v. United States, 838 A.2d 1140, 1155-
56 & n.13 (D.C. 2003) (asserting that "prosecutors are expected to resolve all reasonable
uncertainty about the potential materiality of exculpatory evidence in favor of prompt
disclosure," but upholding the conviction because the defense had not shown prejudice from
the belated disclosure of nearly $9o,ooo in payments to two witnesses (internal quotation
marks omitted)). A fair trial remedy would allow defendants to attempt this showing of
prejudice before or during trial.
34. The requirement of permanent prejudice thus circumvents the objection that cross-
examining a government witness using belatedly disclosed Brady material is adequate to
remedy prejudice posed by delay. Cf United States v. Gaytan, No. 95-10210, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10238, at *5 (9th Cir. Apr. 18, 1996) ("The Government's disclosure in this case,
while unquestionably untimely and inconvenient to the defense, provided additional
impeachment evidence against the Government's primary witness. It occurred during direct
examination of the witness, and the defense was able to utilize the revelation to its
advantage during cross-examination. Thus, the Government's mistake was easy to
remedy.").
35. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,437-38 (1995).
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responsibility if he will, any argument for excusing a prosecutor from
disclosing what he does not happen to know about boils down to a plea
to substitute the police for the prosecutor, and even for the courts
themselves, as the final arbiters of the government's obligation to
ensure fair trials. 36
The defense could request the remedy in a motion before trial or, if the
suppression came to light during the trial, outside the jury's presence. If the
defense made the requisite showings, it would be within the trial court's
discretion to permit a Brady argument in closing and a jury instruction similar
to the following:
In this case, the government failed to turn over promptly, as required
by law, a piece of evidence favorable to the defense, namely [evidence],
of which the defense learned only on [date], when [means of
disclosure]. Although this delay does not necessarily bear on the guilt
or innocence of the defendant, you may, if you think it appropriate in
light of all the evidence, take into account the possible harm to the
defense caused by this delay when evaluating whether the government
has proven the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Even in the case of an egregious suppression, the trial court would have
discretion not to grant the remedy, depending on the court's assessment of the
suppression's evidentiary relevance and the possible unfair prejudice to the
government of revealing the suppression's existence to the jury.37 To reduce the
unfair prejudice to the government, the court might strictly limit the scope of
the defendant's Brady argument to the harm caused by the delayed disclosure,
rather than allowing the defendant to suggest, for instance, that the
government suppressed the favorable evidence out of desperation at the
weakness of its own case. Moreover, the trial court would retain the option of
granting a continuance or dismissing the charges. Under federal and some state
laws, neither the government nor the defense would likely be permitted to
appeal the trial court's interlocutory order on this issue.38
36. Id. at 438 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, alteration in original)); cf.
Sundby, supra note 18, at 659-60 ("Perhaps Brady's most important pre-trial function is that
it stresses the prosecutor's responsibility for and the need to be aware of all evidence within
the government's possession.").
37. See FED. R. EVID. 402-403.
38. Traditionally, the state and federal governments are allowed to appeal rulings in criminal
cases only with express statutory authority, see Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 245
(1981), which would not exist in this context, at least initially. The law on appeals by
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Defendants who were convicted despite receiving the remedy could still
argue on appeal that the Brady error rose to the level of a Bagley violation,
meriting a reversal of the conviction, because the prejudice to the defense
raised a reasonable probability of a different result. Undoubtedly, winning this
argument would be extraordinarily difficult - more so than meeting the Bagley
standard in a typical Brady case.39 But the defendants for whom this remedy is
designed would not have typical Brady appeals to begin with, because in their
cases the suppression emerged before or during trial. Even without the fair trial
remedy, the obstacle posed by the Bagley standard to such defendants is likely
insurmountable, because the defense had the opportunity to make some use of
the favorable evidence at trial.4' The fair trial remedy, while perhaps adding to
the Bagley burden on appeal, would introduce the possibility of circumventing
Bagley completely: If the remedy led a jury to find that the government had not
proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant would never face any
appellate burden whatsoever.
B. The Remedy as Cure
The proposed remedy would delegate to juries a task currently assigned to
appellate courts. Before the hindsight-burdened reassessment on appeal, 4 1 the
jury would consider the possible prejudice to the defense resulting from the
Brady violation in light of the evidence presented at trial. The jury would know
that the government had illegally hindered the defense and would be exhorted
by defense counsel to acquit the defendant in part on the basis of the
suppression, because the suppressed evidence itself raised a reasonable doubt
defendants varies among the states, but, in federal court, the Supreme Court's holding in
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949), does not appear to
permit an appeal of this decision.
39. See supra note 24 (addressing the difficulty of meeting the Bagley standard in the ordinary
cases in which suppressions are discovered after conviction).
40. It is not even clear that courts would consider Bagley arguments in such cases. The evidence
has been "disclosed" to the defense, in the sense that the defense knows of the evidence
during at least a portion of the trial, even if the evidence was not disclosed in accordance
with the jurisdiction's Brady law and rules. Under Bagley, the defendant must show a
"reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)
(emphasis added).
41. See Capra, supra note 21 (discussing the problem of review based on what the trial might
have been and proposing that trial courts review prosecutors' files in camera for Brady
evidence). See generally Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in
Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 575-80 (2oo4) (discussing judges' cognitive
biases in conducting harmless error review).
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about the defendant's guilt; because the government's failure to disclose the
evidence evinced the weakness of its case; or because, if the defendant had
known of the evidence earlier, the defendant would have found proof of
innocence or at least further evidence to undermine the government's case. The
jury might accept one of these arguments, or the jury's generally enhanced
scrutiny of the government's case might uncover a reasonable doubt the jury
would not otherwise have noticed.
The remedy would give the most aid to defendants in cases in which the
government's evidence is not overwhelming -for instance, when the
government's case relies heavily on one or two eyewitness identifications. In
cases of overwhelming evidence against the defendant, the defendant's Brady
argument would be unlikely to affect the outcome, but could still remedy the
unfairness of the trial. (And because, in these cases, the defendants now lose on
appeal for harmless error, the remedy would not leave these defendants worse
off.)
Defense counsel might worry that Brady arguments could inadvertently
shift the burden of proof to the defendant in jurors' minds, by drawing jurors'
attention to the possibility of exculpatory evidence, or the lack thereof. This
worry might be especially warranted if the suppressed evidence, though
favorable, does not strongly undermine the government's case or suggest
innocence. Accordingly, whether or not to request the remedy would be a
strategic decision.
One might also be concerned that the proposed remedy could harm
defendants if their counsel chose to argue prejudice instead of investigating
exculpatory Brady leads. As it is, however, many criminal defense attorneys lack
sufficient time and resources to investigate, and some may be deeply skeptical
of their clients' protestations of innocence. Insofar as defense counsel do
investigate exculpatory leads today despite these obstacles, it seems unlikely
that they would not continue to do so while also arguing prejudice.
Furthermore, the court could refuse to allow the defense to argue Brady to the
jury if the court granted a continuance or found that the date the suppression
came to light had given the defense sufficient time to investigate live leads.
C. The Remedy as Deterrent
A fair trial remedy would give criminal trial courts an intermediate remedy
when suppressions surface: one likely rarer and more effective than a simple
continuance, but not as extraordinary as an outright dismissal of the charges.
At the same time, the courts would acquire better means to deter Brady
violations, a power analogous to civil courts' authority to use discovery
sanctions for deterrence purposes. I do not propose that courts should grant
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal 1AA1
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the remedy solely to deter prosecutorial misconduct whether or not the harm
warrants the remedy.42 However, remedying the harm to one defendant might
prevent others.
The remedy might deter Brady errors in two ways. First, the prospect of
adverse consequences at trial might spur individual prosecutors to evaluate
more carefully whether evidence is favorable to the defense, to be more diligent
about seeking Brady evidence from elsewhere in the government, and to
disclose promptly. Second, if prosecutors do suffer lost convictions, jury
nullification, or public outcry, their offices might be provoked into developing
better bureaucratic infrastructures for gathering and disclosing Brady evidence,
both within their offices and in their relationships with police departments. 4
Although the fair trial remedy would be granted only rarely, even the risk
of its being granted might reduce prosecutorial Brady negligence. As Bennett L.
Gershman has written, "[t]hat prosecutors actually do assess the risks and
benefits associated with misconduct is an intuitively, anecdotally, and
empirically well-founded conclusion."' Yet, as it stands now, there are nearly
no adverse consequences for prosecutors' derogation of their Brady duties:
Even when prosecutors make egregious Brady judgments that "cannot be
reconciled with .. common sense, '4 courts do not dismiss the charges. The
fair trial remedy would introduce an adverse consequence: Hearing about the
prosecutors' Brady error would draw the jurors' attention to evidence favorable
to the defense and might lead jurors to examine more scrupulously other
elements of the government's case.
Studies of the traditional means of deterring prosecutorial misconduct
suggest that this remedy is well tailored.46 A recent cost-benefit analysis, for
instance, concluded that "any attempt to curb prosecutorial abuse must focus
on modifying the cost-benefit calculus of those responsible for its existence,"
and that "where individual discretionary choices are the culprit, the sanction
42. Cf. Henning, supra note 30 (criticizing the "incongruous results" of reversing a conviction
solely for the purpose of deterring prosecutorial misconduct).
43. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (discussing the prosecutor's responsibility for
all relevant information in the government's possession).
44. Gershman, supra note 25, at 430.
45. Bennett v. United States, 797 A.2d 1251, 1254, 1256 (D.C. 2002) (commenting on a
prosecutor's judgment that a key witness's previous lie about seeing another murder was
"irrelevant" and not material under Brady).
46. See Dunahoe, supra note 15 (analyzing the deterrence value of various penalties for
prosecutorial misconduct); Meares, supra note 22, at 891-9o (concluding that the current
means of controlling prosecutorial misconduct are "very weak" and proposing financial
incentives as a solution).
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must be . . individualized."4 7 Another scholar has similarly described
contempt as a "more attractive" deterrent for prosecutorial misconduct than
reversal, because it "is directed specifically at the misconduct of the prosecutor"
and is less expensive for the criminal justice system than a new trial. 48 Like
contempt, the fair trial remedy would also be directed at the individual
prosecutor and would cost the court little or nothing to grant.
But there are reasons to doubt whether the proposed remedy would
actually deter Brady violations. Sanctions for discovery violations in the civil
context have not ended discovery abuse, despite the fact that the Supreme
Court has explicitly authorized their use for deterrence purposes.49 Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, courts may, for instance, deem the violators
to have made admissions in their opponents' favor on contested issues,
disallow certain claims or defenses or evidence, strike pleadings, dismiss or
default, treat the violation as contempt, require the party to pay expenses
caused by the violation, or instruct the jury on misconduct.5 0 Scholars attribute
the failure of these sanctions to the unwillingness of trial courts to dismiss
cases or enter default judgments, and, when they do impose sanctions, the
possibly excessive frequency with which appellate courts overturn them."1 The
47. Dunahoe, supra note 15, at 50; see also id. at lO9-1o (describing the author's criteria:
"congruency, individuality and efficiency").
48. Meares, supra note 22, at 894 (noting, however, that contempt proceedings are still "not
cheap").
49. See Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976) (per curiam)
("[T]he most severe in the spectrum of sanctions provided by statute or rule must be
available to the district court in appropriate cases, not merely to penalize those whose
conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might be
tempted to such conduct in the absence of a deterrent.").
5o. FED. R. CIV. P. 37; see also Stephen R. Bough, Spitting in a Judge's Face: The 8th Circuit's
Treatment of Rule 37 Dismissal and Default Discovery Sanctions, 43 S.D. L. REv. 36, 39 (1998)
(discussing the range of sanctions).
51. See Bough, supra note 50 (arguing that the Eight Circuit too hastily overturns discovery
sanctions); Jodi Golinsky, The Second Circuit's Imposition of Litigation-Ending Sanctions for
Failures To Comply with Discovery Orders: Should Rule 37(b)(2) Defaults and Dismissals Be
Determined by a Roll of the Dice?, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 585, 590-95 (1996) (lamenting the lack
of uniformity of enforcement among circuits and arguing for clearer standards); Barbara J.
Gorham, Fisons: Will It Tame the Beast of Discovery Abuse?, 69 WASH. L. REv. 765, 765
(1994) (exploring a Washington Supreme Court case affirming a dismissal for discovery
abuse against what the author describes as "the backdrop of the historic failure of courts to
impose meaningful sanctions for discovery abuse"); Florrie Young Roberts, Pre-Trial
Sanctions: An Empirical Study, 23 PAC. L.J. 1, 82 (1991) (discussing a study of pretrial
sanctions in the Central District of the Los Angeles County Superior Court and finding that
"certain trends were evident which revealed that the judges may not be using their power to
sanction to the full extent possible in order to prevent discovery and other pre-trial abuse").
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first systematic empirical study of motions for monetary discovery sanctions
found that in approximately forty-eight percent of cases in Los Angeles, trial
courts granted the motion on the violation, but did not impose the party's
requested monetary sanction." Moreover, the study found that when monetary
sanctions were imposed, they were 53.3% smaller on average than requested-
so small as to be ineffective, the study's author suggested. 3
Like monetary sanctions in the civil context, a fair trial remedy would only
be effective as a remedy or a deterrent if courts actually granted the remedy
when warranted. Yet the number of cases in which a criminal trial court would
be presented with even the opportunity to implement the remedy proposed in
this Note would be few. First, nearly nine out of ten criminal cases result in
plea bargains rather than trials.' Second, prosecutors suppress favorable
evidence in only a fraction of the cases that do go to trial, and only another
smaller fraction of these suppressions is discovered before the jury's verdict.
Third and finally, defendants aware of suppressions would have to be able to
show sufficient prejudice to warrant courts' granting the remedy.
Even if used infrequently, however, a fair trial remedy might prove a more
effective deterrent than Rule 37 sanctions due to the nature of the remedy
proposed and differences between the two types of misconduct. First, unlike
the harsher discovery sanctions, the remedy would neither deprive a litigant of
her day in court nor relieve one side of its burden of proof on a particular issue.
Rather, the Brady argument and instruction would more generally emphasize
to the jury the need to scrutinize the government's case. Accordingly, then,
criminal courts might be more inclined to grant this remedy than civil courts
are to dismiss cases or relieve a party of part of its burden of proof in response
to discovery violations.
Second, prosecutors might be more susceptible to deterrence than civil
litigants are. Although impossible to prove, the role of simple negligence may
be relatively greater - and of bad faith lesser - in the Brady context than in the
civil context. That is, even if some Brady violations are the product of strategic
considerations, patently unlawful strategic behavior may be less pervasive
among prosecutors than among civil litigators; prosecutors are, after all,
charged with doing justice.5s Even the most strident critics of prosecutors'
52. Roberts, supra note 51, at 82-83.
3- Id. at 83.
s4 Sundby, supra note 18, at 658-59 (noting that, although the Supreme Court has not held
that Brady "could never apply to a guilty plea, the Court also repeatedly emphasized that
Brady was a trial-related right distinct from the decision to plead guilty" (citing United
States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002)).
55. SeeBergerv. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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Brady failures acknowledge that many violations likely come about in spite of
prosecutors' good intentions. s6 If Brady violations are not usually the result of a
conscious choice made in bad faith, a small increase in vigilance across the
board could help many defendants. The hope is that the very existence of the
remedy would cause prosecutors to take more care in carrying out their Brady
duties out of heightened fear of imperiling their convictions.
Admittedly, the effectiveness of the remedy as a deterrent would be hard to
prove. Because only a small portion of Brady misconduct is both known to the
defense and memorialized in public records, measuring Brady misconduct
before and after the remedy's enactment would be extremely difficult. But one
could take a random sample of serious felony cases before and after the
remedy's implementation and measure the length of time between Brady
demand letters and the government's responses, the length of time before trial
of Brady disclosures, and the frequency of recorded unsolicited disclosures.
Alternatively, one could evaluate the effectiveness qualitatively, interviewing
defense counsel, prosecutors, and judges and investigating whether individual
prosecutors' offices-and police stations-had taken steps to improve Brady
compliance through better bureaucratic mechanisms and increased training.
III. HOW MIGHT THE REMEDY BE ESTABLISHED?
The fair trial remedy might be established by legislation, amendments to
the rules of criminal procedure, or litigation in various courts. For a host of
reasons, litigation seems the most likely means.
A. Rule Changes
The chances of implementing this reform through legislation or voluntary
rule changes are slim. For advocates of Brady reform, the proposed fair trial
remedy might seem to yield too little benefit: Though it might widely deter
Brady misconduct, on its face it is limited in application to a small set of cases.
Advocates might prefer more radical reforms to reduce prosecutorial discretion.
For instance, in 1998 the District of Massachusetts promulgated "the most
extensive local criminal discovery rules in the nation."' The Massachusetts
rules greatly reduce prosecutorial discretion, requiring the government to
disclose at least twenty-one days before trial, inter alia, any statement made by
56. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
57. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, Proposed Codification of Disclosure of Favorable Information Under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ii and 16, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 93, 105 (2004)
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal 1465
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
any person that is inconsistent with statements made by witnesses to be called
by the government and "[a] written description of the failure of any percipient
witness identified by name to make a positive identification of a defendant.""8
This unique rule was adopted largely in response to a judge's outrage at the
revelation that the government had literally shredded Brady evidence. 9
Conceivably, other jurisdictions in the wake of similar scandals might take
action along these lines or those recommended by the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice.j
The spread of the Massachusetts rules to other jurisdictions might go a
long way toward reducing Brady violations by defining precisely for
prosecutors the broad range of evidence they must disclose. However, insofar
as other jurisdictions continue to rely solely on prosecutors' discretion to judge
the favorability of evidence to the defense, and as long the Bagley harmless
error standard governs on appeal, prosecutors will fail to carry out their Brady
duties -and fail with impunity. The aim of the fair trial remedy is to curtail
this impunity and deter violations by curing defendants' Brady harms in the
rare cases when Brady suppressions come to light before conviction.
B. Brady Litigation
Given that the proposed reform is a trial remedy, litigation seems a more
likely way to bring it about. This might well occur in state courts, with
piecemeal change. Litigators could find cases in which the defense was
irremediably prejudiced by the government's delay in disclosing Brady
evidence, and then seek to argue Brady to the jury and request the jury
instruction. Conceivably, some individual trial courts frustrated by Brady
violations might grant the novel remedy. 61 There is no obvious legal bar to the
trial court's implementing it, and some states' rules of criminal procedure do
5S. D. MASS. LOCAL R. 116.2(B)(i)(f) (governing the disclosure of exculpatory evidence).
s9. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 57, at 105. The judge cited "a pattern of sustained and
obdurate indifference to, and un-policed subdelegation of, disclosure responsibilities by the
United States Attorneys Office," and ordered both a new trial and the deposition of the
government's principal witness by the defense. United States v. Mannarino, 85o F. Supp. 57,
59 (D. Mass. 1994).
6o. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS CoMM., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY § 11-2.1(a) (3d ed. 1996) (requiring many disclosures "within
a specified and reasonable time prior to trial," including the names and addresses and
written statements of"all persons known to the prosecution to have information").
61. One exasperated New Orleans judge who threw out three murder convictions in the 199os
for suppressing evidence has reportedly gone so far as to order prosecutors to take law
classes. Armstrong & Possley, supra note io.
1466 Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
115:1450 2006
A FAIR TRIAL REMEDY FOR BRADY VIOLATIONS
specifically provide for "such other order as [the court] deems proper" in
response to a prosecutor's failure to perform disclosure duties. 62 For instance,
when the Supreme Court ruled that the Due Process Clause does not require
reversal for the government's failure to preserve merely potentially exculpatory
evidence,63 the trial court below had allowed the defendant to argue in closing
that testing of the destroyed evidence would have proven his innocence, and
the court had instructed the jury that "[i]f you find that the State has . . .
allowed to be destroyed or lost any evidence whose content or quality are in
issue, you may infer that the true fact is against the State's interest."
64
If trial courts refused to grant the remedy, and such a case reached a state
or federal court of appeals, the court could vacate the sentence and order a new
trial with the fair trial remedy. The court could reason that, unlike some
pretrial constitutional violations in which the harm occurs entirely before and
independent of the trial ,6 Brady errors harm the accuracy and fairness of the
trial itself and implicate defendants' fundamental rights under the Fifth, Sixth,
and Fourteenth Amendments. Therefore, trial courts should preemptively
correct the trial itself rather than allowing it to go forward unconstitutionally.
Ideally, the Supreme Court would establish the remedy, so that it would be
available across the country.66 An opportunity for the Court to consider this
remedy might arise if litigators capitalized on the Court's conflicting dicta
regarding the standard prosecutors should apply in deciding whether to
disclose favorable evidence. In Kyles v. Whitley, Justice Souter implied that the
Bagley standard -"reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed
to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different ' 6, - is
both the standard of review and the standard to be applied, pretrial, by
prosecutors. 68 But prosecutors' applying Bagley's "reasonable probability"
62. CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 40-5(8).
63. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988).
64. Id. at 59-60 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting the transcript in arguing that it was unlikely
that the evidence's destruction prejudiced Youngblood's case).
65. For example, most Fourth Amendment violations would fall into this category.
66. The Supreme Court has not foreclosed preconviction avenues to enforcing defendants'
rights under Brady. United States v. Agurs, for instance, contemplates at least limited in
camera review of the government's evidence to determine whether alleged undisclosed
evidence falls under Brady. 427 U.S. 97, io6 (1976).
67. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
68. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) ("But the prosecution, which alone can know
what is undisclosed, must be assigned the consequent responsibility to gauge the likely net
effect of all such evidence and make disclosure when the point of'reasonable probability' is
reached.").
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standard seems inapt, because Bagley's "reasonable probability" is a
retrospective judgment about what happened at trial. 6' The standard might
better be phrased for prosecutors in a different verb tense, requiring them to
turn over evidence which, were it disclosed to the defense, would have a
reasonable probability of affecting the outcome of the trial. But, not yet
knowing the defense's case, how could a prosecutor judge the probabilities?
Justice Stevens has grasped this distinction between retroactive Brady
judgments on appeal and the judgments of prosecutors, whose failures to
disclose can change what takes place at the trial. In Strickler v. Greene, Justice
Stevens wrote that even when suppressed evidence does not raise a doubt
sufficient to require reversal, the suppression is still a violation of prosecutors'
"broad obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence."7 ° Recently, in granting a
criminal defendant's pretrial motion to compel disclosure of favorable evidence
in a securities case, a federal district court conducted an analysis along similar
lines, finding that "the definitions of materiality as applied to appellate review
are not appropriate in the pretrial discovery context."7' Instead, the court relied
on "the plain meaning of 'evidence favorable to an accused' as discussed in
Brady."
72
Seizing on Justice Stevens's and lower courts' analyses, the Supreme Court
could hold that it is unconstitutional to proceed with a trial in which a severely
prejudicial suppression has been discovered but not remedied. The Court could
suggest the fair trial remedy as one means-though not dictated in particular
by the Constitution-by which to correct what would otherwise be an
unconstitutional trial. If lower courts followed the Supreme Court's lead, the
remedy would become a nonconstitutional remedy to secure defendants' Brady
rights. The remedy's nonconstitutional status would mean that, if legislators
objected to its abuse, they could overturn it. However, they would be faced
with the alternative of courts being forced to dismiss charges completely in
cases of permanent prejudice to the defense.
Courts of appeal would develop a second standard of review for analyzing
trial courts' refusal to grant the fair trial remedy. They would likely leave trial
courts broad discretion, mirroring the abuse-of-discretion standard for civil
69. Other observers have noted this problem. See, e.g., Kevin C. McMunigal, The Craft of Due
Process, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 477,479 (2001).
70. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999).
71. United States v. Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1199 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
72. id.
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discovery sanctions.73 A trial court abusing its discretion by denying the
remedy even when faced with the most prejudicial and otherwise irremediable
suppression would be reversed for having violated the defendant's rights to
due process and a fair trial.74
CONCLUSION
A prosecutor's duty to ensure "'that justice shall be done"' includes
disclosing to the accused the favorable evidence in the government's
possession.7" Although the Due Process Clause may not require reversing
convictions for every suppression, the frequency with which prosecutors
violate their "broad obligation to disclose76 is unjust. A fair trial remedy would
correct the injustices inflicted upon a few defendants and, by reminding
prosecutors of their duty, could prevent many more.
73. See Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976) (per
curiam). Abuse of discretion is also the standard when criminal courts deny a defendant a
jury instruction on a defense for lack of factual basis. See United States v. Gomez-Osorio,
957 F.ud 636, 642 ( 9th Cir. 1992) ("In general, [a] defendant is entitled to have the judge
instruct the jury on his theory of defense, provided that it is supported by law and has some
foundation in the evidence. Logically, if the parties dispute whether the required factual
foundation exists, the court should apply an abuse of discretion standard of review."
(internal quotation marks omitted)); accord Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63
(1988).
74. By "otherwise irremediable," I mean otherwise irremediable by a lesser remedy, such as a
continuance; in all cases, outright dismissal of the charges would remain an alternative.
75. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 n.6 (1985) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
76. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999).
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